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use#LAATHE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY AND 
TAKINGS OF PROPERTY: 
CASTLES, INVESTMENTS, AND JUST OBLIGATIONS 
Joseph William Singer* 
    This Article examines three models of property that can help us make 
sense of otherwise intractable takings doctrine. The two best understood 
models are the “castle” model, which conceptualizes owners as having ab-
solute domain over their property as long as they do not use it to harm oth-
ers, and the “investment” model, which conceptualizes property as a form of 
investment in a market economy that creates reasonable expectations likely 
to yield economic rewards. Ultimately rejecting both of these models as in-
complete, the author praises the Supreme Court’s return in Lingle v. Chev-
ron USA, Inc. to the Penn Central idea that the Takings Clause protects property 
owners from unjust obligations while rendering them subject to just obliga-
tions. The Article argues that the castle and investment models overempha-
size individual rights, while the Penn Central test’s notion that owners have 
obligations as well as rights rests on a conception of “citizenship.” This citizen-
ship model provides a useful framework for analyzing when property rights 
are subject to regulation to prevent harm and when investment-backed expecta-
tions are justiªed; it can thus help direct our attention to the core question 
of “justice and fairness” that is at the heart of the Takings Clause as it has 
been interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
 
For a man’s house is his castle . . . .
1
 
           — S i r   E d w a r d   C o k e  
            Third  Institute  (1644) 
 
                                                                                                                              
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks and affection go to Martha Minow, 
Robert Boxie III, Jon Cohen, Bart Lounsbury, Jed Purdy, Cosim John Sayid, and Nick Sydow. 
An earlier form of this Article was presented at the Georgetown Environmental Law and 
Policy Institute’s eighth annual Conference on Litigating Takings and Other Constitutional 
Challenges to Land Use and Environmental Regulations, held at Harvard Law School on 
October 27–28, 2005. 
1 Sir Edward Coke, Third Institute of the Laws of England 162 (1644). The 
complete quotation is: “For a man’s house is his castle, et domus sua cuique tutissimum 
refugium.” The Latin means: “and his home his safest refuge.” See Semayne’s Case (1603) 
77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.) (“[T]he house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as 
well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.”), quoted in Wilson v. 
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609–10 (1999); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) 
(“[E]very man’s house is his castle.” (quoting Judge  Thomas McIntyre Cooley, A 
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative 
Power of the States of the American Union 299 (1868))); William Blackstone, 3 
Commentaries 288 (1768) (“[E]very man’s house is looked upon by the law to be his 
castle . . . .”); William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries 223 (1765–1769) (“[T]he law of 
England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it 
stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity . . . .”); Miller v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting William Pitt’s 1763 speech in Parlia-
ment: “The poorest man may in his cottage bid deªance to all the forces of the crown. It 
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the 
rain may enter; but the king of England may not enter—all his force dares not cross the 
threshold of the ruined tenement!”). 310  Harvard Environmental Law Review  [Vol. 30 
[The takings clause is] designed to bar Government from forc-
ing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
2 
           —Justice  Hugo  Black 
            Armstrong  v.  United  States  (1960) 
I. Introduction 
John Kenneth Galbraith used to tell a story about Robert Montgomery, 
who was a professor of economics at the University of Texas. Montgom-
ery’s liberal views “made him unpopular with the Texas legislature.”3 Poli-
tics being what it is, “[a]n investigation was set in motion.”4 Galbraith tells 
us that “[w]hen he was asked if he favored private property, Montgomery 
replied, ‘I do—so strongly that I want everyone in Texas to have some.’”5 
Is this a liberal story or a conservative story? On one hand, Galbraith 
was a famous liberal and clearly meant it to have progressive overtones. 
The moral of the story would appear to be that government action is needed 
to regulate the use or distribution of property to ensure that it is not lim-
ited to the few.6 On the other hand, the idea that society should be based 
on ownership has a conservative ring to it. Protection of the rights of 
owners suggests limiting government regulation, a favorite conservative 
pastime. 
President Bush has tried valiantly to sell a number of his policies, espe-
cially his proposed partial privatization of Social Security, by telling us 
that he wants to create an “ownership society.”7 This image is cleverly meant 
 
                                                                                                                              
2 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
3






 See Frank Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method, 59 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 91, 99 (1992): 
In a capitalist order, one person’s proprietary value (or power) is obviously rela-
tive to other people’s. A constitutional system of proprietary liberty is, therefore, 
incomplete without attending to the conªgurations of the values of various peo-
ple’s proprietary liberties. The question of distribution is endemic in the very idea 
of a constitutional scheme of proprietary liberty. 
See also Joseph William Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property 141 (2000) 
(arguing that “[w]idespread distribution of property is virtually a deªning characteristic of 
private property systems—or at least the norms that justify such systems”). See generally 
Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (1988) (arguing that if property is 
useful because of its intimate connection with the ability of the individual to exercise free 
will, then we cannot remain indifferent to the fact that some people lack property, at least 
if we intend to treat each individual with equal concern and respect). 
7
 See Mike Allen & Jonathan Weisman, Bush to Present His Agenda for a Second 
Term; President to Tout “Ownership Society,” Wash. Post, Sept. 2, 2004, at A29; David E. 
Rosenbaum, Bush to Return to “Ownership Society” Theme in Push for Social Security 2006]  The Ownership Society and Takings of Property 311 
to appeal to both liberal and conservative impulses. The protection of own-
ership suggests transferring power from government to individuals, de-
creasing the size of government and increasing the realm of liberty, while 
the idea of a society of owners suggests spreading the wealth and promoting 
equality.8 
President Bush is taking advantage of the positive associations we 
have with ownership, of the perception that owners have it better than non-
owners.9 Given the abstract choice between owning property and not 
owning property, I know what I would choose. Ownership connotes wealth, 
power, security, freedom from want, and independence; these things, in turn, 
increase our individual liberty by giving us the space and the resources 
necessary to lead our lives according to our own design. At the same time, 
we have some evidence that a market society will leave a lot of people 
out of the ownership class if it does not use government to mitigate the 
inequalities it generates. A society based on ownership may therefore be 
a Jeffersonian utopia of dispersed ownership with equal individuals im-
bued with the power to live their lives fully. Or, it could be John Edwards’s 
“Two Americas”10—divided between rich enclaves, characterized by gated 
communities, private schools, and private pensions, and poor communi-
ties condemned to unsatisfactory schools and wages that are insufªcient to 
sustain a decent life, much less to amass property or to obtain the secu-
rity and freedom associated with ownership. As Hurricane Katrina high-
lighted for us, this is the difference between those who have options and 
those who get left behind. 
But Hurricane Katrina showed us something else. All owners depend 
on government to create the infrastructure necessary to protect our prop-
erty. This is an easy truth for Americans to forget. In the Social Security 
context, the privatized ownership image promoted by President Bush ap-
 
                                                                                                                              
Changes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2005, at 20; Warren Vieth, Bush Makes His Pitch for “Own-
ership Society,” L.A. Times, Sept. 5, 2004, at A25. 
8
 See Laura S. Underkufºer, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power 
138 (2003) (“Property rights, it is argued, provide individual security and (in the process) 
diffuse political power. They create and protect material wealth and prosperity, necessary 
preconditions for social civility, social stability, and the maintenance of democratic institu-
tions.”); see also Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed 
Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1237, 1243 (2005) (proposing an approach 
to property based on the idea that it is a dynamic social institution that promotes freedom 
by setting “the terms on which people are able to recruit each other for social coopera-
tion”). 
9
 On the precarious position of non-owners, see Jane B. Baron, Property and “No 
Property,” 42 Hous. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006); Jane B. Baron, Homelessness as a Prop-
erty Problem, 36 Urb. Law. 273 (2004); Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of 
Freedom, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 295 (1991); Jane B. Baron, The “No-Property” Problem: 
Understanding Poverty by Understanding Wealth, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1000 (2004) (book 
review). See generally Joseph William Singer, The Edges of the Field: Lessons on 
the Obligations of Ownership (2000). 
10
 See Jim Rutenberg, Edwards Highlights His Theme of “Two Americas,” N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 7, 2004, at A21. 312  Harvard Environmental Law Review  [Vol. 30 
peals to the sense that an owner is secure in the ability to beneªt from 
funds set aside for retirement; those are your funds and they cannot be 
taken by others, especially not by the greedy hands of government bureau-
crats. An “ownership society” therefore seems to expand ownership and 
reduce government regulation. From this perspective, the security associ-
ated with ownership can be contrasted with the insecurity associated with 
leaving things in the hands of government. This suggests that government 
need not provide the infrastructure necessary to create security; the rec-
ognition of property rights is enough to accomplish this. The liberal re-
sponse to President Bush’s proposal is that private accounts involve pri-
vate risk. The security offered by social security came from the “social” 
part of the equation. In reality, Social Security requires taxpayers to fund 
beneªts for other people, not for themselves. We get security from our will-
ingness to help each other in times of need, and that requires us to be willing 
to pay taxes and to regulate ourselves to obtain the protections that only 
collective action can provide. From this perspective, an “ownership soci-
ety” seems to require signiªcant government support. 
What would an “ownership society” look like? The answer to that ques-
tion depends on what we mean by “ownership.” Conservatives tend to 
view ownership as embodying both expansive rights and strong protec-
tions from government interference. The conservative framework sees 
property and regulation as opposites: broad property rights mean less 
regulation and more regulation means less protection for property rights. 
Liberals often adopt a similar model; they simply press for more expansive 
regulation of property to achieve competing social goals, such as racial 
equality or environmental protection. Both conservatives and liberals tend to 
frame the issue as the extent to which government should regulate owners. 
But this misstates the issue fundamentally. Property is not inimical to 
regulation. Indeed, as the legal realists taught us long ago, the private 
property system is a form of regulation. After all, government action is 
needed to allocate initial entitlements, to deªne the bundles of rights that 
accompany ownership, and to adjudicate conºicts among owners and 
between property rights and other legal entitlements. Moreover, many 
forms of regulation exist precisely because they protect property rights. 
Zoning law, for example, is popular in the United States precisely because it 
protects owners from neighboring uses that would decrease the value of 
their property or interfere with the use and enjoyment of their land. In 
fact, traditional nuisance law has always limited the free use of property 
to protect the security of neighboring owners. Therefore, ownership does 
not mean, and has never meant, the absolute right to do what one wants on 
one’s own land. 
Owners are free to use their property as they wish, but they are not free 
to use their property to destroy or injure other persons or other persons’ 
property. John Stuart Mill captured this insight in his essay On Liberty, 
when he argued that the state had no business interfering with “self-regard-2006]  The Ownership Society and Takings of Property 313 
ing acts” (those actions that concern oneself alone). The state’s only le-
gitimate function was to resolve conºicts among individuals whose ac-
tions harm the legitimate interests of others.11 If we take Mill’s approach 
as a starting place, we might ask whether the exercise of a property right 
should be understood as a self-regarding act; if so, the state should keep 
its hands off the owner and the owner’s property. On the other hand, acts 
of ownership that affect others—that cause externalities—come within 
the realm that is legitimately subject to regulation in the public interest. 
Conservatives argue for an expansive interpretation of the rights of 
owners with correspondingly narrow limits on the powers of government. 
This means that they have a large vision of which acts of ownership are 
self-regarding in nature; they view most property rights and their exercise 
as legitimately concerning the owner alone. If almost every exercise of a 
property right is viewed as a self-regarding act, then the state has no busi-
ness interfering with it. Liberals argue for a more expansive realm for 
government regulation, and in so doing, they by necessity take a narrower 
view of the range of acts of ownership that are legitimately self-regarding 
in nature.12 
How should we think about this issue? Scholars generally approach 
this question by identifying a decision procedure that provides guidance 
in choosing between the conºicting interests of the parties. This procedure 
may be based on balancing interests, comparing the costs and beneªts of 
alternative legal rules, imagining what rules would be adopted in a suitable 
setting such as a social contract made by free and equal individuals, or by 
identifying fundamental human interests that should be protected as 
individual rights. I want to step back and consider how we think about this 
question before we apply a decision procedure. We approach the question 
of deªning property rights partly by adopting conceptions of what owner-
ship means. These conceptions are embodied in conscious or unconscious 
images that orient our thinking in particular directions and frame our 
analysis of the underyling policy question. 
We can observe two common models of ownership in legal discussions 
about property and the relation between property owners and the 
 
                                                                                                                              
11
 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 141–42 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 
1974) (1859): 
As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of 
others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general wel-
fare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it becomes open to discus-
sion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person’s 
conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself . . . . In all such cases, 
there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the 
consequences. 
12
 See Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American 
Law, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 1 (exploring the tension between public interests in protecting 
common resources and public interests in protecting individual expectations). 314  Harvard Environmental Law Review  [Vol. 30 
government. The ªrst image is that of a lord in a castle, and the second is 
that of an investor in a market economy. These two models of property 
focus on the rights of the owner, and they deªne those rights in different 
ways. I want to argue that there is a third model of property and that this 
third model is where the Supreme Court ended up this year. The third 
model of property starts from the idea that owners have obligations as well 
as rights.13 The image that supports this notion is that of a citizen in a free 
and democratic society. This model of property as citizenship adjudicates 
conºicts that arise between the castle model and the investment model. 
The ªrst two models are well-known, although their implications are not 
well-understood. The last model is present in our law and political 
discussions about property, but it has been marginalized and suppressed. 
The most dramatic encounters between owners and the government 
take place when government seizes property by eminent domain or regulates 
it so substantially that the property has arguably been “taken” by the 
government. I will therefore develop these three models of “ownership” by 
using eminent domain and regulatory takings as a context for exploring 
them. 
II.  Two Models of Property: Castles and Investments 
The most common image of property is the castle. We have all heard 
the adage that “a man’s house is his castle.”14 This idea is deeply embed-
ded in our consciousness; Sir Edward Coke used it in a book published in 
1644.15 Modern scholarly discussions of property often start by quoting 
Sir William Blackstone’s description of ownership as “sole and despotic 
dominion.”16 This suggests an image of the feudal lord in his castle, mas-
 
                                                                                                                              
13
 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 Ecology L.Q. 631, 
638–39 (1996), quoted in Susan Ayres, The Rhetorics of Takings Cases: It’s Mine v. Let’s 
Share, 5 Nev. L.J. 615, 619 (2005) (“[Owners are] charged with the responsibility for us-
ing [property] within the bounds of community norms governing right and wrong land 
use.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 387 (2001) (arguing that the legal system places 
obligations on owners not to deviate from a ªxed and limited number of “forms of prop-
erty” under the “numerus clausas” principle in order “to standardize property rights, and 
thereby reduce the widespread information-gathering and processing costs imposed on third 
parties by any system of in rem rights”). 
14
 The masculine pronoun has signiªcance; it suggests a traditional patriarchal image 
of the family with a single head of household who is the man in his roles as husband, fa-
ther, and owner. This image also suggests one owner in control of the land and all who 
enter or live on it; this traditionally included members of the lord’s family. 
15
 Coke, supra note 1. 
16
 The fact that Blackstone in no way supported a regime of absolute or even near ab-
solute property rights, that he viewed the law of property as a wholly social creation, with the 
details of ownership based on positive and not natural law, and that he supported a regime 
of detailed regulation of estates in land, in no way detracts from the importance of the 
image of property he propounded. See William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries passim 
(U. Chi. Press 1979) (1765–1769); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Black-
stone’s Anxiety, 108 Yale L.J. 601 (1998). 2006]  The Ownership Society and Takings of Property 315 
ter of all that happens inside. The concept of dominion suggests a useful 
ambiguity. It refers both to property and sovereignty, management and 
governance. Duncan Kennedy described this model as the lynchpin of 
classical legal thought at the time of the Lochner era. He described that 
core idea as “power absolute within its judicially-delimited sphere.”17 
Consider the Kelo case.18 The City of New London decides to take ti-
tle to an entire neighborhood to facilitate an urban renewal project. The 
property will be taken from some private owners and sold or leased to other 
private owners. The Kelos, among others, refuse to sell their home. They 
like living where they have resided for years, and their feelings in this 
regard are perfectly reasonable and comprehensible. They concede that 
the city could take their land to build a road or a public facility, but they 
object to the use of the eminent domain power if the property is to be 
transferred to another private entity. What rights do they have?19 
The ªrst possibility is that the Kelos have the right to veto the trans-
fer of title. Their home is their castle. As owners, they have sole power to 
determine whether and to whom to sell it. Our federal constitution rejects 
this extreme libertarian position. Property can be taken for public use upon 
payment of just compensation. The city, however, was taking the prop-
erty to be transferred to the use or ownership of another private entity or 
person. The Kelos argued that they had the power to veto such a transfer 
of title, and Justice Thomas agreed with them.20 Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court majority of ªve rejected this position.21 Your home may be your 
castle, but there is a higher authority that can take it away using a magi-
cal power called “eminent domain,” as long as the transfer serves a le-
gitimate public purpose. According to the current Supreme Court doctrine, 
the promotion of economic development is such a purpose. 
The second possibility is that the Kelos do not have veto rights. 
Rather, the city has the power to take the property as long as it pays fair 
market value. In this view, the property is worth what it would likely fetch 
on the open market, no more and no less. Payment of fair market value 
makes the owners whole; if they are rational investors, they should be indif-
ferent between keeping the house and receiving the money. This view of 
property as a mere investment is sometimes taken by economists who use 
market measures to determine the value of property and hence the appro-
priate rules of property law. Although we have determined that owners are 
paid no more than fair market value for their land when the government 
takes it for public needs, almost everyone would agree that the Kelos have a 
legitimate complaint when they argue that the money is not the same as 
 
                                                                                                                              
17
 Duncan Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought 31 (1975) (unpublished 
manuscript, on ªle with the author). 
18
 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
19
 Id. at 2661. 
20
 Id. at 2677–87. 
21
 Id. at 2658–69. 316  Harvard Environmental Law Review  [Vol. 30 
the house.22 The value of the house to them is more, perhaps much more, 
than its fair market value. Their asking price is higher than the fair mar-
ket value. It may in fact be inªnite. Some owners may refuse to sell at any 
price. We know it is unfair, but we limit owners to fair market value when 
government takes their property only because the courts cannot ªgure out 
an objective way to measure the psychic harm caused by the loss of one’s 
family home or business. This does not mean, however, that the harm does 
not exist. 
The Kelo case was hard partly because the castle model and the in-
vestment model conºict with each other.23 Worse still, both models are prob-
lematic. The castle model gives owners complete veto power over takings 
of property even for a public purpose, while the investment model gives 
owners nothing more than fair market value. The castle model gives the 
owner too much power, while the investment model gives owners too few 
rights.24 They both must be tempered in some way. 
III. Tensions  Within  Our Basic Property Models 
A.  The Castle Model 
I will use the fact setting of the Lucas case to illustrate how the cas-
tle and investment models of ownership apply to regulatory takings.25 You 
may recall that Lucas involved an owner who purchased land on the South 
Carolina coast in an area that had been developed for residential homes 
in the past. The area was subject to extensive regulation as a fragile coastal 
 
                                                                                                                              
22
 See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic De-
velopment Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1005, 1020 (arguing 
that uncompensated, nonpecuniary losses, such as destruction of communities, are one 
justiªcation for banning economic development takings (citing Jane Jacobs, The Death and 
Life of Great American Cities 5 (1961))). 
23
 The contrast between understanding property as a castle and an investment owes much 
to the prior work of Jeremy Paul who identiªed modes of analysis in regulatory takings 
law that distinguished between a model based on “enlightened physicalism” and a “mar-
ket” model. See Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1393, 1442 (1991). 
24
 For other interesting and instructive explorations of competing models of property 
embedded in takings jurisprudence, see Ayres, supra note 13, at 625 (exploring the tension 
between basing property rights on custom or practical wisdom, past actions or future 
choices, static or ºuid rights); Carol M. Rose, “Takings” and the Practices of Property: 
Property as Wealth, Property as “Propriety,” in Property and Persuasion: Essays on 
the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership 49, 52 (1994) [hereinafter Rose, Prop-
erty and Persuasion] (exploring the conºict between a “dominant, preference-satisfying 
practical understanding of property” and a “traditional, quite divergent understanding of 
property as ‘propriety’”). 
25
 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). For an excellent analysis of 
the history of the case and the complexities involved in environmental regulation of the 
shore, see Carol M. Rose, The Story of Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Be-
tween Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in Environmental Law Stories 237 (Richard 
J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005). 2006]  The Ownership Society and Takings of Property 317 
area, but the law had drawn a line in a way that allowed Lucas to build on 
the land he bought. Some time after he purchased the land, the law was 
changed, prohibiting construction on his land. The parties stipulated that 
his million dollar investment in the land purchases had been reduced to 
nothing—a dubious proposition but part of the settled law of the case.26 
Retroactive application of the new regulatory law had therefore taken Lu-
cas’s investment just as surely as if the state had excluded him from the 
land. Not only did Lucas get no return on his investment, but he also lost 
everything he had invested so far. 
The Supreme Court held that deprivation of all economically viable 
use constituted a per se taking of property requiring compensation unless 
the land use Lucas contemplated would have been impermissible under 
background principles of property law, such as the law of nuisance, at the 
time he purchased his land. On remand, the state supreme court held that 
construction of a house on the beach did not constitute a common law 
private or public nuisance despite the fact that the cumulative impact of 
many such constructions might have very harmful effects on the coast-
line.27 The fact setting is very similar to that in Palazzolo,28 a case involv-
ing development on the coast of Rhode Island, and Tahoe-Sierra,29 a case 
involving a temporary construction moratorium on land surrounding Lake 
Tahoe. The question for us is how to conceptualize the property rights at 
stake in such cases.30 
According to the castle model of ownership, within the borders of one’s 
land, the owner is supreme and can do whatever he wishes. Outside one’s 
property, one must obtain the consent of other owners to enter their land and 
have dealings with them.31 In this model of the lord in his castle, the cen-
tral question is what it means to stay within one’s own borders. Another 
way to put this is: whose castle is it anyway? If an owner’s act hurts the 
property interests of a neighbor, government regulation may be needed to 
protect the ownership rights of the victim. The castle image suppresses 
 
                                                                                                                              
26
 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010, 1015; see also id. at 1076 (statement of Souter, J.). 
27
 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). 
28
 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (state not immune from a regulatory 
takings claim just because an owner acquired title after the regulatory law came into ef-
fect). 
29
 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) 
(a temporary moratorium on construction not a per se taking). 
30
 See Rose, Property and Persuasion, supra note 24, at 50 (“[I]n a very practical 
way, takings jurisprudence depends on some underlying conception of what your property 
rights entitle you to have and what they do not.”). 
31
 It is an issue of contention whether this model includes any public property; tradi-
tionally, it does. After all, one might need to travel on a road to get to the neighbor’s house 
or store. Lack of public streets might have the effect of imprisoning an owner in her own 
home. See Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 Theoretical 
Inquiries L. 79 (2001) (explaining the problems caused by excessive privatization); see 
also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998) (explaining the tragedy of underused private 
property). 318  Harvard Environmental Law Review  [Vol. 30 
the ways in which one castle can be used to invade another. Consider the 
case of State v. Shack,32 which involved the question of whether a doctor 
and a lawyer were committing a trespass by entering a farmer’s property 
without his consent to provide medical and legal services to migrant farm 
workers employed and housed there. The farmer’s view was that they were 
on his property and he had a right to exclude them or to admit them on 
conditions that he would set. Moreover, the workers had not bargained for 
the right to receive such visitors and in the absence of a contract giving 
them the right to entertain such guests, the control of the property remained 
in the hands of the owner, who was the farmer. The castle belonged to the 
farmer and regulation of the terms of the contract would amount to pater-
nalistic regulation. 
The defendants in this criminal trespass case argued that they had a 
right to visit the farm workers in their own homes, and that the workers had 
a right to welcome visitors in their homes. It has long been part of the 
law of the United States that tenants have a right to receive visitors, but it 
was not clear whether the workers counted as tenants under the contrac-
tual arrangements regulating their relationship with the farm owner. The Su-
preme Court of New Jersey had no problem agreeing with the defendants’ 
claim, noting that it was “unthinkable” that the farmer could assert a “right 
to isolate” the workers from the outside world; such a claim amounted to 
“paternalistic behavior.”33 
In effect, the court found the farmer’s claim to be akin to a claim of 
the privileges of a feudal lord who had the power to condition entry on 
his land in any way he wished. The U.S. rejection of feudalism meant that 
lords could not retain unlimited powers of sovereignty over individuals 
whom they allowed to come onto their land. Rather, U.S. property law 
required that power over property be pushed downward to those who ac-
tually occupy the land. In this reading of the case, the farmer could choose 
whether to house migrant farm workers, but once he does so, they have 
certain rights inhering in their status as employee-residents, including the 
right to receive visitors. If they have such rights, then it is the workers, 
not the farmer, who own the castles and have the power to determine 
whether the doctor and lawyer have rights to enter the land. The question 
then boils down to the question of whether it was the farmer’s land or the 
workers’ homes that constitute the castle. 
The castle image plays out a little differently in the context of land 
use disputes among neighbors. In Lucas, for example, the question was 
whether development of coastal land had negative effects on others that 
the legislature was empowered to regulate. The most expansive view of 
the rights of owners would allow them to do anything at all as long as 
their acts took place within the borders of their own land. This view fo-
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cuses on the place where the conduct occurs and ignores the place where 
the effects of that conduct are felt. In contrast, the most restrictive view 
would stop owners from doing anything at all that negatively affects indi-
viduals outside the borders of their land. This view deªnes all actions with 
external effects as other-regarding acts that are presumptively illegal. 
Neither of these views is sustainable and neither has actually been seriously 
proposed by anyone. 
It is understood, as the Lucas court acknowledged, that the law of 
nuisance always prevented owners from acting on their own land to un-
reasonably harm the property rights of their neighbors or the public at large. 
The judges who developed the common law knew that many exercises of 
property rights were anything but self-regarding acts. Yet the prohibition 
of all other-regarding acts would have prevented owners from doing al-
most anything on their land, interfering both with their liberty and the 
well-being of society as a whole. The question then became how to iden-
tify acts of ownership that were to be considered of legitimate concern to 
the owner alone. In other words, despite harmful externalities, an act of 
ownership might be viewed as self-regarding because others have no le-
gitimate interest in stopping the conduct, despite the fact that the act harms 
them. 
The legal realists tried to get beyond the self-regarding/other-regarding 
dichotomy by deªning all acts of property as other-regarding.34 Libertari-
ans have sought to recreate the distinction.35 Regardless of one’s attitude 
on the utility of the distinction, it is important to recognize that it is unlikely 
to be eradicated completely. A society that values individual liberty is 
almost certain to create and nurture intuitions about the types of actions 
that are presumptively outside the legitimate realm of government regula-
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tion. Those intuitions, in turn, affect the way litigants, lawyers, and judges 
understand land use conºicts and hence the law of regulatory takings. 
If we think of property as a castle and the rights of owners as “abso-
lute within their spheres,”36 we are led to a particular way of thinking about 
land use disputes. The central question in this model is what it means to 
stay within one’s own borders. There are, in turn, two ways of conceptu-
alizing what it means to “stay within one’s borders.” 
First, we might ask whether the owner acted within his borders to create 
signiªcant harm outside those borders. This view allows owners to cause 
some harm to others; as noted above, the prohibition of all harm would 
effectively prevent the emergence of property rights in the ªrst place. The 
question is whether the harm is signiªcant; if it is, it comes within the 
purview of the legal system. If, however, the harm is not viewed as signiª-
cant, either in quantity or quality, then the acts can be viewed as legitimately 
self-regarding. 
The second way to conceptualize what it means to “stay within one’s 
borders” is to ask whether the owner has exceeded the scope of the rights 
traditionally granted to owners by the legal system. This is the approach 
suggested by Justice Scalia, who poked fun at the distinction between harm-
preventing and beneªt-conferring laws in his opinion for the Court in Lu-
cas.37 In this view, an owner has stayed within his borders if his actions 
do not exceed the powers granted owners over their physical land by the 
common law (deªned in some suitably objective way).38 
Lucas’s desire to build a house appeared to most of the Justices on 
the Supreme Court and the South Carolina Supreme Court, on remand, to 
be a self-regarding act.39 Despite the possible negative consequences to 
neighbors and the public as a whole that might ºow from further devel-
opment of the coastline, both courts viewed those harms as lacking signiª-
cance—although real, they were necessary consequences of the exercise 
of property rights. On one reading, those harms were not viewed as sub-
stantial; they were harms that neighbors should bear in the interest of living 
with other owners. On another reading, those harms were not caused by 
Lucas; they were the effect, not of his development, but only of the cumula-
tive development of many owners. A ªnal view is that those harms would 
never have been regulated either by the common law of nuisance or by 
any other traditional background principles of property law. However one 
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understands the legal resolution of the case, the courts appear to have con-
cluded that the construction of a house on one’s land is of legitimate con-
cern to the owner alone; it cannot constitute a nuisance even if similar de-
velopment by many owners in the vicinity would impose signiªcant harm 
on coastal areas. Lucas was acting within his borders—or within the 
boundaries of his property rights as an owner—and he had full power to 
decide to build or not to build. Thus, if others are interested in stopping 
him from exercising his rights as an owner, they are entitled to do so only 
if they have a legitimate public purpose and, even then, only by compen-
sating Lucas for the loss of his property. 
A conservative answer to the question of staying within one’s bounda-
ries suggests that owners have a large realm of freedom and that regula-
tions of property use are presumptively invalid.40 The conduct of owners 
should generally be presumed to be self-regarding in nature; the complaints 
of others in the face of the exercise of property rights are, in general, un-
justiªed and illegitimate. The character of the government action embod-
ied in the regulatory laws in Lucas was deprivation of the ability to use 
the land in any meaningful way when the owner’s acts were of no legiti-
mate concern to anyone other than the owner himself. 
A liberal answer to the question of what it means to stay within one’s 
borders is that many or even most acts of ownership affect others and that 
owners have obligations to mitigate those consequences when they are signi-
ªcant. Governments are instituted to regulate conduct that is harmful to 
others, and the fact that harm is caused by the use of property, rather than 
by the movement of one’s ªst, is of no moment.41 The character of the 
government action in Lucas, according to the liberal view, was regulation 
designed to prevent an owner from causing grave harm to public interests 
and to other owners. Ownership never entailed the ability to participate 
in destroying the coastline, the very boundaries of the state itself. There 
is no vested right to destroy the very land that is the subject of ownership. 
Preventing such harms is one of the central reasons for which we created 
the state in the ªrst place. 
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Most scholars recognize that a physical model focused on the geo-
graphic location of acts and injuries is inadequate to deªne what it means 
to stay within the lines. Land use regulation almost always involves conºict-
ing interests. The legal realist answer was to balance competing interests 
by reference to policy considerations; the efªciency theorists adopt a similar 
approach, eschewing conceptualistic distinctions between self-regarding 
and other-regarding acts or formalistic analysis of precedent. As the up-
roar created by the Kelo case shows, however, both judges and the gen-
eral public remain captive to such conceptual concerns; they often have 
strong intuitive reactions to particular cases of regulation based on pre-
vailing images of the rights of the owner. Those rights are based on common 
understanding, tradition, or precedent, and at their core is the issue of 
what it means to act as an owner within one’s borders. 
B.  The Investment Model 
The second image of property is that of an investment in a market 
economy. In this model, the scope of property rights depends on a theory 
of legitimacy, such as the desert-oriented rights theory of John Locke or 
the utilitarian theory of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The Lockean 
approach focuses on individual desert—one who applies his or her labor 
to the earth deserves to reap where he or she has sowed. An owner who 
has invested capital deserves the rewards that accompany the delayed gratiª-
cation associated with investment.42 The utilitarian approach justiªes an act 
of ownership to the extent that it promotes the general welfare. An act can 
thus be regulated or prohibited to the extent that it undermines social util-
ity.43 
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The castle model judges the legitimacy of both property and regula-
tion by asking whether the owner has spilled over the borders of his land 
or exceeded the scope of his rights deªned by law or tradition. The in-
vestment model focuses instead on protecting the justiªed expectations of 
investors.44 The models overlap because an owner who is exercising a tradi-
tional property right may be said to have justiªed expectations in the 
continued exploitation of that right despite the harmful effects on others. 
The models diverge because the castle model deªnes the rights of the owner 
by reference to physicality or tradition; if a right is traditional, then, un-
der the castle model, the owner’s justiªcations are by deªnition legitimate. 
The central question in the castle model is one of power; if the power is 
one of ownership, then it cannot be regulated without compensation. In con-
trast, the investment model tests the owner’s expectations by asking whether 
they are economically justiªed. The fact that a right is traditionally le-
gally protected counts in favor of its continued exercise, but it is not a bar 
to regulation. 
The contrast between these two models explains the disagreement be-
tween Justices Scalia and Kennedy in the Lucas case. Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion utilized the castle model; he argued that an owner has the 
right to be free from a regulatory law that reduces his property value to 
nothing when the use contemplated by the owner would have been within 
the traditional scope of rights granted owners before the imposition of the 
regulation.45 In Justice Scalia’s view, owners’ rights are absolute within their 
spheres, at least when confronted with regulations that would destroy 
them entirely, regardless of the social consequences of their proposed prop-
erty use. Thus, Justice Scalia suggested that Lucas had legitimate, in-
vestment-backed expectations that he would be able to build houses on 
his two lots. His neighbors had all built homes and at the time Lucas bought 
his lots, it was lawful for him to do so as well. Construction of his house 
did not cause any harms traditionally regulated by either common law or 
statute, and thus his investment-backed expectations were necessarily le-
gitimate. 
In contrast, Justice Kennedy argued in his concurring opinion that the 
fact that an act of ownership has not been proscribed by tradition or law 
is not an automatic bar to regulation even if the regulation would destroy 
all economic value of the property.46 The question in the case was whether 
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the owner’s investment-backed expectations were reasonable; this required a 
judgment to be made, not a determination of powers or a deªnition of 
borders. Justice Kennedy’s view was echoed by Justice O’Connor in her 
concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island and adopted by the full 
Court in Tahoe-Sierra in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy. 
Of course, the fact that the investment model asks whether the inves-
tor’s expectations were reasonable does not preclude a ªnding that they 
were indeed reasonable. So a conservative might argue that Lucas’s invest-
ment-backed expectations were legitimate and thus protected from post 
hoc alteration by changes in regulatory law. After all, Lucas bought the 
land for development purposes that the law allowed, and he had the right 
to a reasonable return on his investment. Of course, Lucas was not allowed 
to use his land to cause substantial harm to others, but the construction of 
a home (at least in the abstract) cannot be characterized in this way. Nei-
ther prior law nor prior custom ever identiªed the harms associated with 
home-building to be of such import as to justify a total prohibition. Regula-
tion, of course, may be allowed. The zoning law upheld in Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. authorized limiting property to residential 
use when it was associated with an average reciprocity of advantage; re-
strictions on land use may impose costs, but the restrictions on the 
neighbors confer beneªts that outweigh those costs.47 In such a regulatory 
scheme, one can see an advantage for the individual owner (rather than in-
trusive regulation) because the beneªt is greater than the costs. No such 
reciprocity could be observed in Lucas. Lucas was prohibited from doing 
something all his neighbors were allowed to do. 
The liberal version of the Lucas case is quite different. Science ad-
vances and gives us new knowledge. We now know the importance of wet-
lands and coastal areas for the environment. We may not have known this 
in 1789, but the Founding Fathers believed in science and the “progress 
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our legal tradition. The common law of nuisance is too narrow a conªne for the 
exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society. The State 
should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to 
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of the useful arts.”48 They were participants in the Enlightenment. They 
would not have wanted us to blind ourselves to the effects that unlimited 
development has on the environment on which all property ultimately de-
pends. We would cut off our noses to spite our faces by allowing devel-
opment that would lead to the destruction of all our property. It was because 
of advances in scientiªc knowledge that coastal regulation and wetlands 
regulation had begun in the ªrst place. At the time when Lucas bought his 
land, there had already been more than thirty years of such regulations, and 
they had become increasingly intrusive over time. Was it reasonable for 
Lucas to assume that these laws would never change? Was it reasonable 
for him to invest in coastal land on the assumption that if he got in under 
the wire, he would have a vested right to build his homes in an area he 
knew to be environmentally sensitive? 
The liberal answer may be that his expectations were unreasonable. 
He did not deserve complete freedom to build on such land because he knew 
or should have known that such construction might cause substantial and 
unreasonable harm to the property of others. Nor is it efªcient to encour-
age investment in such land by insulating owners from the need to consider 
whether the laws might change to further regulate such property in the pub-
lic interest. This is the problem of moral hazard. One may have a right to 
reap what one has sowed, but one cannot reasonably expect that one has 
a vested right to spew toxic chemicals into the ground just because one 
hundred years ago we did not know the harm such chemicals could cause.49 
The key issue for property owners is that investments, after all, involve 
risk, and one risk that investors should be forced to internalize is that of 
foreseeable new regulations designed to protect the public from the harms 
attendant on the cumulative effects of individual acts of ownership. 
IV.  Castles and Investments in Current Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine 
The castle model focuses on allocating power based on a clear deªni-
tion of the scope of property rights that does not change because of evolving 
values or social conditions; the goal is to deªne the borders of ownership 
and to protect the rights of those who stay within the lines. In the castle 
model, the rights of investors are deªned ex ante on the basis of objective 
rules, traditions, and norms. The investment model, in contrast, focuses 
on the protection of justiªed expectations based on possibly shifting 
judgments of legitimacy that may vary over time as social conditions and 
values change. This model presumes that owners are subject to a fair amount 
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of risk, including both the risks associated with new development next 
door and with new government-imposed limitations on development. Le-
gitimacy of expectations comes partly from custom, tradition, and prece-
dent and also partly from democratic lawmaking and normative judgments 
about fairness and welfare. The question for the castle model is whether 
the owner was acting within his rights or whether he slipped over the border. 
The question for the investment model is whether the owner’s expectations 
are justiªed, and this question cannot be answered without resort to a 
normative conception that can distinguish between justiªed and unjustiªed 
expectations.50 
These ªrst two models are not deªnitive in solving actual cases. 
They may lead to different results depending upon the assumptions en-
tered into the model. For example, one might adopt a conservative version of 
the castle model and conclude that Lucas was acting within the bounda-
ries of traditional ownership rights when he proposed to construct homes 
on the coast; at the same time, one could adopt a liberal version of the in-
vestment model and conclude that his expectations that those rights would 
continue were unreasonable given the recent history of coastline regula-
tion and the important public interests served by it. Alternatively, one might 
adopt a liberal version of the castle model and conclude that current sci-
entiªc understanding teaches that Lucas’s proposed construction posed 
signiªcant risks to his neighbors and the public at large and thus exceeded 
the scope of his rights as an owner, spilling over the borders; in the same 
case, one could adopt a conservative version of the investment model and 
conclude that the regulatory change designed to prevent such clear and pre-
sent harms was sufªciently abrupt and unpredictable as to render it unfair 
in the absence of compensation. 
Regulatory takings doctrine embodies both the castle and investment 
models.51 The standard Penn Central test requires considerations of three 
central factors that derive from the two models—the character of the gov-
ernment action, the economic impact of the regulation, and the extent to 
which the regulation interferes with reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectations.52 The castle model suggests that property includes certain core 
entitlements that cannot be taken or infringed without compensation, re-
gardless of the public interests involved. This model underlies the 1982 
Loretto decision, which deªned the permanent forced invasion of prop-
 
                                                                                                                              
50
 For an excellent and fascinating analysis of the difference between these two modes 
of thought, see Laura S. Underkufºer, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of 
Property and Justice, 21 Const. Comment. (forthcoming 2006) (Duke Law Sch. Legal Stud-
ies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 84, 2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=820266. 
51
 See Rose, Property and Persuasion, supra note 24, at 65 (“[T]he incompatible 
elements in our takings law emerge from the oil-and-water mixture of a dominating prefer-
ence-satisfying conception of property on the one hand, with a weaker but very different 
conception of property as propriety on the other.”). 
52
 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 2006]  The Ownership Society and Takings of Property 327 
erty by strangers as a per se taking of property,53 and the 1992 Lucas case, 
which deªned total deprivation of economic value as a per se taking unless 
the proposed use would have exceeded the traditional scope of the owner’s 
rights prior to the imposition of the regulation.54 The investment model un-
derlies the vested rights cases such as the 1979 Kaiser Aetna case which 
prevented regulatory agencies from revoking regulatory permissions once 
an owner has invested in reliance on an existing regulatory scheme.55 It is 
also the core of just compensation law which denies owners the actual value 
of the land to them and limits them to its fair market value even if the 
cost of replacing what was taken would far exceed the property’s fair market 
value.56 
The Supreme Court’s last term may mark the beginning of a sea change 
in regulatory takings doctrine. The effort to identify per se takings of 
property, which began in 1982 with the Loretto decision, appeared to come 
to a crashing halt in the 2005 decision in Lingle v. Chevron,57 which lim-
its per se takings to forced invasions (as in Loretto) and complete depri-
vations of value (as in Lucas). This change was foreshadowed by Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Palazzolo58 and seemingly adopted by 
Justice Kennedy’s majority decision in Tahoe-Sierra.59 The Lingle deci-
sion appears to put the last nail in the cofªn; the case-by-case approach 
favored by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy appears to have won out over 
Justice Scalia’s rules-based approach.60 The potential roles of Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justice Alito remain to be seen. 
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This would suggest that current doctrine has attempted to use the castle 
model (in cases like Loretto and Lucas) but conªnes it to extreme cases. 
Thus, the heart of regulatory takings law seems to have been taken over 
by the investment or “justiªed expectations” model. The investment model 
immunizes owners from regulation by reference to tradition only in the 
most extreme cases. Otherwise it subjects those expectations to the cru-
cible of human judgment to determine their reasonableness. 
V. A  Third  Model:  Citizenship 
How should the courts determine the appropriate realm of the castle 
model? How should they decide when investment-backed expectations are 
justiªed? That is where the third model comes in. The ªnal model of prop-
erty is based on the notion of obligation associated with the concept of 
citizenship. What is crucial here is that citizens have obligations as well 
as rights.61 Those obligations may be to refrain from exercising power over 
one’s property, such as is asked of us when we limit land use by zoning and 
environmental laws. But those obligations may also require afªrmative ac-
tion. We may be asked to pay taxes, to share our property with others, to do 
things on our own land for the express beneªt of others, whether or not 
we receive a like recompense. We may be asked, for example, to provide 
access to our businesses for those who use wheelchairs. This may require 
us to spend money even if the increase in business does not fully com-
pensate us for this investment.62 These legal obligations are routinely im-
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posed on property owners. What do they teach us about the rights of own-
ers? 
The castle and investment models start from the premise of individ-
ual rights; they place the burden of persuasion on the state to justify lim-
iting the presumably absolute power of owners. The citizenship model starts 
from different premises and asks a different question entirely. It starts 
from the assumption that obligations are inherent in ownership.63 Part of 
what it means to be a member of society, to be an owner among owners, 
is to be part of a real or imagined social contract that limits liberty to 
enlarge liberty, that limits property to secure property. This does not mean 
that obligations are justiªed merely because they are demanded by soci-
ety; it does mean that the central question is whether the obligation is fair 
or just. When the state constrains the powers of owners or purports to limit 
previously recognized property rights, the citizenship model asks whether 
the obligation is one that “in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole,”64 “rather than remain disproportionately concentrated 
on a few persons.”65 
The Lingle decision makes the Penn Central test the core of regula-
tory takings doctrine. Although that test is designed to determine when 
government regulations go too far in impinging on property rights, it is 
premised on the notion that others have substantial obligations, both to other 
owners and to the public. The Penn Central test asks us to evaluate sev-
eral factors against a bedrock standard. That standard is based on the ques-
tion of whether the burden on the owner is fair or just. The core of pri-
vate property, according to the unanimous view of the Supreme Court, is 
protection from unjust obligations.66 
While this understanding assumes that owners have obligations, as 
well as rights, we expect owners to be free to look after their own inter-
ests. This is, after all, the core principle of the classical liberalism of Hobbes 
and Locke. According to Michael Walzer, liberalism is the invitation to 
act in a self-interested manner (within limits designed to ensure that oth-
ers are similarly free to act in a self-interested manner).67 This is a phi-
 
                                                                                                                              
result from being marked as a social outsider or lacking the sense of belonging that one 
can get only if integrated into whatever a community’s ordinary social life may be.”). 
63
 See Underkufºer, supra note 50, at 21–27 (arguing that the Scalian view of prop-
erty—a variant of what I have called the “castle” view—characterizes property rights in a 
“one-sided” fashion that gives “no consideration [to] the interests of the state, or [to] those 
whom it represents”). 
64
 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
65
 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978); see Cosim John 
Sayid, Property and Citizenship: What Kelo Leaves Behind (Aug. 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript, on ªle with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (arguing for a citizenship 
focus in analyzing regulatory takings issues and emphasizing the centrality of issues of 
distributive justice). 
66
 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123. 
67
 I recall this striking phrase from Professor Walzer’s lectures on political theory at 
Harvard University in the late 1970s. 330  Harvard Environmental Law Review  [Vol. 30 
losophy at odds with all others that had preceded it in the history of the 
world. But this philosophy never amounted to a call to anarchy, and Mill’s 
theory of self-regarding acts sought to bridge the divide between the call 
to indulge in self-interest and the call to refrain from self-aggrandizement at 
the cost of harm to others. Liberalism sought, in John Rawls’s reformula-
tion of the Kantian view, “the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others.”68 This means that owners are legitimately 
subject to just obligations and that such obligations are in no way incom-
patible with the concept of ownership. The only question is whether a 
law limiting the rights of the owner is a just obligation. 
Obligation is inherent in liberalism, but the castle and market models 
marginalize it. They seek to suppress consciousness of the obligations inher-
ent in ownership, to draw our attention away from them. They ask us to 
presume that self-interest is justiªed both by rights-oriented norms of liberty 
and utility-oriented goals of welfare. The citizenship model seeks to con-
fer freedom and equality on all persons, spreading rights to all, but it si-
multaneously places owners in the role of guardians of social order. This 
position of guardianship entails duties to refrain from actions that endan-
ger the underpinnings of a free and democratic society that treats all in-
dividuals with equal concern and respect. Professor Gregory Alexander ex-
plains that property was always associated with norms of propriety as 
well as self-interest.69 Property serves social as well as individual functions. 
A libertarian version of the citizenship model would adopt a user fee 
model of government. If we think of government as based on a social con-
tract entered into by self-interested individuals, then citizens will only 
agree to accept obligations if the beneªts of those obligations match or 
outweigh their costs. The lord in the castle will only part with property to 
a vassal if that vassal confers services on the lord in return—services that 
the lord views as acceptable compensation for loss of control of the land. 
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The market investor similarly expects a return on his investment. Some 
ºexibility may be allowed around the edges; a strict user fee model of gov-
ernment would be unworkable. So we make a concession to practicality 
by asking for an average reciprocity of advantage—or what Professor Rich-
ard Epstein usefully calls “implicit in-kind compensation.”70 The libertar-
ian version of this model suggests, however, that any sacriªce that is dis-
proportionate to the beneªt is not one that can be fairly asked of an owner in 
the absence of compensation. 
In contrast, a liberal version of the citizenship model contains a more 
expansive understanding of “what we owe each other.”71 Liberals are more 
likely to react with favor to redistributive programs and are less likely to 
expect a user fee model of government. Liberals worry a great deal about 
the distribution of property; this includes worry about the unequal distri-
bution of the burdens of ownership, as when polluting factories are lo-
cated in areas dominated by poor people or disempowered racial groups. 
This liberal worry about the distribution of the burdens of property ex-
plains why many liberals sided with the Kelos to oppose the taking of 
their house for transfer to a big corporation. They saw themselves as seeking 
to limit the power of government to oppress the weak in favor of the 
powerful, to protect small owners from big owners. Of course, this worry 
about disparate impacts is also a conservative stance when it comes to 
regulatory takings. The conservative argument for compensation is that it 
is unfair for the burdens of public programs to be visited on those few 
property owners whose property is seized for the public good. 
This means that there is a crucially important convergence between 
liberals and conservatives. Both start from the premise that the distribu-
tion of the beneªts and burdens of property ownership is a topic of funda-
mental importance. While property burdens are appropriate when they regu-
late socially destructive conduct or result in an average reciprocity of advan-
tage, they become problematic when they impose a disparate impact on 
individual owners. How should we think about this distributive question? 
I agree with Laura Underkufºer, who argues that the crucial question is 
not just the rights of the individual owner vis-à-vis the state but the right 
relationships that must be established between that owner and others in 
the community. She argues that “the question of justice or fairness in law—
on which takings cases are purported to depend—is an inherently rela-
tional inquiry.”72 It is crucial to remember that assignment of a property 
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right to an individual necessarily denies that same right to others.73 This 
means that “justice requires consideration of competing interests and com-
peting claims.”74 Owners do not live alone and when their exercise of prop-
erty rights affects others, the interests of those others need to be taken 
into account to determine whether any obligation imposed on a property 
owner is just or fair.75 
The common-sense, layperson’s idea of property focuses on the cas-
tle model. Underkufºer notes that we tend to envision property as “a bul-
wark surrounding a sphere of individual liberty; it is an absolute and inal-
ienable right, which provides security and protection.”76 However, as the 
legal realists taught us long ago, rights are correlative; the recognition of 
a right to exclude implies a duty on others to stay off your land just as the 
privilege to use property implies that others are vulnerable to the effects 
of your use of your property.77 This means that the idea of property as a 
castle conºicts with what Underkufºer calls the “institution” of property. 
In practice, the relational and necessarily allocative character of property 
means that “in its institutional form, [it requires] the resolution of conºict-
ing claims and conºicting desires for what are often external, physical, 
ªnite goods.”78 
If we start from the premise that owners in a free and democratic so-
ciety have obligations as well as rights, as the Supreme Court has long 
reminded us, the citizenship model question for the Lucas case is whether 
the obligation imposed on Lucas by the coastal regulatory commission is 
just and fair. The conservative answer may be that it was not. The neighbors 
had all developed their land and Lucas was seeking to do no more than 
they had done. His planned property use was lawful when he bought the 
land and he could not have anticipated that he would be prohibited from 
building a house just as his neighbors had done. In the conservative view, 
it is just to ask Lucas to sacriªce his investment only if he beneªts from 
that sacriªce. On the user fee model, the beneªt must be equal to the sacri-
ªce; on a looser standard, there must be an average reciprocity of advan-
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tage such that his sacriªce can be justiªed by a signiªcant beneªt to him 
personally. The conservative (and perhaps the liberal) view of the case is 
that the harm caused by him individually is minimal and the sacriªce 
being asked of him great. He is not being treated with “equal concern and 
respect,” as Ronald Dworkin puts it;79 rather, he is being asked to suffer a 
disproportionate burden for the good of the community. He is a victim of 
the disparate impact of a law designed to beneªt the whole community, 
and it is only fair to demand that the general public pay for dispropor-
tionate burdens on individuals. 
The contrary answer of environmentalists and many liberals might be 
that the obligation on Lucas was fair indeed.80 The neighbors were pro-
tected by a grandfather clause; there was no need to tear down their homes 
and requiring them to do so would have caused harm while conferring no 
signiªcant public beneªt.81 But seeking to prevent further construction to 
prevent inevitable future harm was legitimate because the effects of Lu-
cas’s desired action, if compounded by similar future actions, could generate 
devastating harms to individuals and to the public as a whole. Moreover, 
Lucas cannot claim unfair surprise when he purchased a type of land that 
had long been subject to special regulations to prevent those devastating 
harms. He can thus be held responsible for preventing the harms that would 
emerge if everyone acted as he did. This argument appears to be a liberal 
argument; after all, it justiªes government regulation. But of course, an 
alternative conservative tradition faults judicial activism and counsels defer-
ence to the legislature, especially when the legislative act depends on con-
tentious political and normative judgments implicating expert knowledge 
such as judgments of environmental policy. Judges adhering to this con-
servative tradition, and intent on applying the law rather than making it, 
might uphold the regulation as an act of judicial restraint in the face of 
clear legislative policy. 
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It may seem paradoxical to think of property rights as imposing ob-
ligations. After all, regulations of property owners appear to be impositions 
on owners and by their nature coercive and inherently suspect. But, both 
modern economic analysis of externalities and environmental analysis of 
ecology teach us about the interconnected nature of individual acts of 
self-interest.82 The quest is for a “fair adjustment”83 of the interests of own-
ers when they conºict with the interests of other owners and society as a 
whole.84 Obligation is not inimical to property; indeed, as the Supreme 
Court has long afªrmed, obligation is inherent in property. We can argue 
about what those obligations can be, but we cannot reasonably argue that 
they do not exist. 
We saw that the castle model offers no clear way to resolve the ques-
tion of what it means to stay within one’s borders. We cannot answer this 
question in a merely physical sense since we are dealing with an act on 
one’s property that causes harm outside the borders of the land. The in-
vestment model may help by suggesting that owners have a right to rely 
on existing regulatory rules—an owner who invests in reliance on a re-
gime that authorizes the proposed use of property arguably has the right 
to rely on the rules in place. This approach deªnes the castle, not by the 
borders of the land, but by the traditional boundaries of one’s legal rights. 
Such an owner has not exceeded the borders of his land because he has 
not exceeded the boundaries of his rights. Yet this solution is no better 
than the physical one. The mere fact that an act is lawful does not mean 
that the law cannot change. No one has a vested right to ignore new laws, 
especially when those laws are enacted to prevent social harms, and Jus-
tice Scalia is correct that clever lawyers can characterize any regulatory 
law as one designed to prevent harm. Nor has property traditionally been 
deªned in a rule-like fashion. Owners have always been subject to obli-
gations to act reasonably (the law of nuisance is a central example),85 and 
the fact that no clear rule prohibited construction of a house on the coast-
line, for instance, is no guarantee that such construction might not be found 
to constitute a public or private nuisance at some point in the future.86 
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Most of the Justices on the Supreme Court itself recognize these dif-
ªculties. This is why Lingle takes us full circle back to Penn Central. 
Many scholars have criticized the Penn Central test.87 They have explained 
that it is incoherent, that it is not really a test, that it gives no guidance.88 
But I believe the Penn Central approach to regulatory takings has much 
to recommend it.89 It appears incoherent because it embodies several dif-
ferent models of property—models that have some intuitive claim to our 
allegiance. When the character of the government action is the “functional 
equivalent of a practical ouster,”90 or when the owner is left with no “eco-
nomically viable use,”91 then the government action seems functionally 
equivalent to an actual taking of title. It is hard to reconcile such takings 
with the idea of ownership. In this sense, the castle model supplies the intui-
tion that may justify ªnding a regulatory taking. When the government 
changes rules in midstream, there is reason to ªnd unfair surprise in the 
face of reasonable, investment-backed expectations. 
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But, as I argued before, there are counterarguments to these intui-
tions. Even permanent physical invasions of property may be justiªed with-
out compensation.92 Consider the public accommodations and fair hous-
ing laws that require owners to rent property or provide services without 
regard to race.93 And retroactive changes in law are clearly justiªed when 
they are designed to prevent substantial harms to others because owners 
never had the right to use their property to cause such harms.94 
Penn Central responds to these dilemmas by asking a simple ques-
tion. Is the obligation posed by a regulatory law “just and fair”?95 Of course, 
it is not as if this question were any easier to answer than questions about 
borders or justiªed expectations. The question does, however, focus our 
attention in the right direction. It invites debate about what obligations we 
have as citizens in a free and democratic society, bound to laws adopted 
by elected ofªcials, but protected by certain basic constitutional rights.96 
Further, it asks us to consider what kind of property regime we want the law 
to support.97 We do not have a clear methodology to answer this question, 
but that may be a virtue rather than a defect of this way of approaching the 
problem. The question of justice and fairness does not relieve us of the bur-
den of judgment, and that—perhaps more than any other reason—explains 
why it is the right question. 
We can see the utility of the castle model by revisiting the Kelo case. 
Remember that the Kelos draw our attention to the castle model. This is 
their home that the city wants to seize, and it had better have a pretty 
good reason for taking it and kicking them out.98 Taking their home to 
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give it to another owner who will pay higher taxes adds insult to injury. This 
is an assault that can be understood by both conservatives and liberals. If 
the goal is economic development and the promotion of tax revenues, there 
must be another way to do this. By seizing the Kelos’ property, the City 
of New London is using them to promote the well-being of others. In Kant’s 
phrase,99 they are being used as means to an end rather than as ends in them-
selves.100 But they are human beings—they are persons—and it is wrong 
to use people in this way. There is no justiªcation for promoting social 
welfare by treating some as if they were not deserving of equal concern 
and respect. 
How does the city respond? First, it says that they are being paid fair 
market value. This is inadequate, it is true, but this is what the Supreme 
Court has said they are entitled to receive. If the problem is that fair mar-
ket value does not compensate them for the psychic harm they suffer be-
cause they are losing their house, then that is a problem that would exist 
even if their house were being taken to build a highway. The remedy for 
this problem is not to prevent the taking but for the state of Connecticut 
to pass a law mandating a premium above fair market value to be paid to 
homeowners who lose their homes for the public good. This will not make 
the owners whole, but it will at least mark that an injustice is occurring 
that requires a compensatory remedy of some kind. 
Second, it is not clear that the city has any other option to achieve its 
goal. Remember that we have made a decision all across this country to pay 
for local services with property taxes. Those services include police, ªre, 
schools, municipal hospitals, and homeland security. Low property values 
mean low taxes, and low taxes mean bad public services, and bad public 
services are what make the middle class ºee—it is a vicious cycle. It is 
not clear that cities have many alternatives to raise their property values 
other than engaging in urban renewal projects like that in New London. It 
might be better for the state or the federal governments to enact programs 
to counteract the problems associated with poor local services, perhaps by 
using taxes other than property taxes to fund them. Absent such changes 
in our practices, the Kelos’ demand that their house not be taken may be 
a demand that urban renewal not happen. Unless alternative remedies are 
found, the claim of veto rights is a claim that property owners have the 
right to stop a local government charged with providing local services from 
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adopting the only program that seems likely to increase the standard of liv-
ing of everyone in the community. That’s a tremendous power. 
There may be alternative ways to achieve these goals. The Kelo deci-
sion leaves it to the states to limit eminent domain power through state 
laws or constitutional amendments if they so desire.101 Many states will 
clearly do this, but some will not. We will have something that conserva-
tives usually like: federalism and local control.102 
Where does this leave us? The Kelos have a very strong argument that 
the obligation demanded of them is unjust. We are asking of them more than 
we have a right to ask. But the city has an equally strong argument that de-
nying it the power to undertake a project of this sort strips it of the only tool 
at its disposal to acquire the resources needed for local services. Moreover, 
the Kelos are being compensated in the same way and in the same amount as 
any owner whose property is taken for public purposes—the pain of a fam-
ily whose house becomes a reservoir or a city hall is no less than theirs. 
The citizenship model does not provide us with a formula to erase 
doubt, nor does it erase “the riddles posed by our allegiance to conºicting 
views of property.”103 Rather, it merely frames the question and asks us to 
consider what really matters. The central question of takings law is whether 
the obligations imposed on an owner by a property law rule are just and 
fair. However you come out on this issue in a particular case, I submit to you 
that this is the right question. 
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